















Factors Affecting Corruption in Developing and Emerging Countries 
 
 








Economic and social indices of a country are becoming increasingly important in explaining a 
developing and emerging country’s level of corruption. Using a Control of Corruption indicator, 
explained by GDP per capita, we find evidence for corruption decreasing as GDP per capita increases in a 
simple regression model. Deeper analysis conducted by including the Human Development Index, and 
Social Progress Index demonstrates that there exists a stronger correlation between theses variables and 
corruption. While some variables (such as GDP per capita) lose significance in the multiple regression 
model, they still have an impact on corruption when regressed together. Consequently, corruption in 






Within the field of econometrics, corruption and its relationship with characteristics of a country 
such as level of education or life expectancy has been extensively researched. Our research aims to 
construct a model able to explain the level of corruption, dependent variable, in developing and emerging 
countries given a set of economic parameters as the independent variables: country's gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita, human development index (HDI), and the social progress index (SPI). Initially, 
a simple-regression model is developed in order to show the effect of GDP per capita on the level of 
corruption for our sample countries. To more accurately justify our research, a multiple-regression 
analysis model is built where GDP per capita, HDI, and SPI are used as independent variables in order to 
predict the level of corruption. The reason this study analyzes developing and emerging countries instead 
of developed countries is based on our premise that governments which are still focused on achieving 
developed nation status can sometimes facilitate or speed up growth by advancing through loopholes or 
ignoring laws. This is done to achieve the national and international benefits that come with being a 
developed country. 
The relationship between Gross Domestic Product per capita and corruption has always been a 
matter of speculation for developing countries. In some countries the correlation is quite evident while in 
others it’s masked to prevent outcomes such as social unrest and decreased foreign direct investment. We 
chose to conduct further analysis on the relationship between corruption and essential growth variables 
for developing countries because the authors of this paper are from developing countries. We have 
experienced first-hand corruption in our countries, being this the reason for us to suspect that GDP per 
capita, HDI, and SPI may have an impact on the transparency of a developing nation and their overall 
competitiveness in the global market. The researchers have seen this vast difference in the above 
mentioned variables between our home countries and developed nations such as the United States, since 
we currently reside in the US which allows us to have an everyday life comparison.  
While it might be logical to conclude that as corruption increases, economic growth in a country 
is slowed down, it is not so obvious to explain the level of transparency in a country’s government by a 
number of general economic measures. What is the economic rationale behind this? Well, several papers 
have provided research on how economic growth can be related to corruption and other government-
related factors, and some of these papers have been included in the literature review section of this paper. 
The rationale behind some of this past research was that corruption prevents an efficient allocation of 
resources, slowing down the growth on countries with these types of governments, as compared with 
other nations where growth is closer to an optimal rate. This economic rationale is relatively simple to 
explain, however, not much research has been done on the opposite relation; could government 
transparency be explained by GDP per capita, HDI, and SPI? The aim of our research is to give a concrete 
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answer to this question. Therefore, increasing GDP per capita in developing and emerging countries may 
lead to a more efficient allocation of resources, and ultimately to a lower level of corruption.  
 
II. Literature Review  
In the literature for corruption and economic growth, one of the main arguments is how 
corruption and government spending have an impact on economic growth. The incidence of corruption 
and its effects on growth is influenced by “how the market for corruption is organized and by the nature 
of services provided by public officials” (Swaleheen), as this ultimately affects the amount of corruption 
in a given country. The results from a single cross-section regression indicates that corruption reduces 
growth significantly, showing that a one standard deviation change in corruption changes the rate of 
growth of real per capita GDP by 0.12 percentage points, which is larger than the effect of a one standard 
deviations change in the investment-GDP ratio. It is therefore demonstrated that corruption has a 
significant, nonlinear effect on the growth rate of real per capita income (Swaleheen). The econometric 
literature has also used regression models along with other econometric models and elasticities which 
concluded that corruption not only causes indirect effects on military and government spending, but also 
that the presence of corruption in these types of spending leads to negative impacts on economic growth 
(d’Agostino et al). The robustness of these results was proven by expanding different factors such as 
levels of economic development, therefore allowing the conclusion of policies aimed at reducing military 
burdens and corruption impact economic growth significantly. As the literature makes apparent, 
corruption has almost always been used as an explanatory variable for dependent factors such as real GDP 
per capita. 
Further analysis of indirect/direct effects of corruption and its impact at different levels based on 
the country has been conducted in the literature. It has been found by researchers that corruption has a 
direct effect on growth. In addition, the same manipulation of other variables did not lead to as big of a 
change in GDP as corruption did. To analyze further, the researchers describe the relationship of 
corruption on GDP as negative but one which declines as corruption increases. Eventually there is so 
much corruption that its effect on GDP is no longer significant. However, since this finding seemed too 
generalized, they analyzed at a deeper level to see how corruption affects countries within their sample. 
They concluded that if a country has almost none to zero corruption, the effect of an increase in 
corruption will have a significant negative effect on GDP. They also found that in countries where 
corruption is already prevalent, corruption actually increases growth, because of the “grease-in-the-
wheel” effect which explains how governments allowing businesses to sidestep policies can lead to 
increased production therefore increased GDP. Overall, the researchers conclude that although GDP is the 
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most affected by corruption in their samples, its level of impact depends on the nature of the country in 
terms of existing corruption. 
Another topic in the literature that analyzes corruption is the effects it has on the relationship 
between foreign direct investment (FDI) and growth in developing countries. Most of the literature in this 
area conducts semi-parametric growth models, with GDP per capita as the dependent variable and FDI as 
the independent, and the index of corruption as a factor influencing the dependent variable. Additionally, 
the models identify the overall effect of corruption in economic growth both directly and indirectly by 
affecting other control variables on growth. The results from one specific model in Delgado et al showed 
how corruption significantly reduces the effectiveness of FDI on growth for 70% of developing countries, 
and strongly suggests that the returns to FDI is a main channel through which corruption reduces 
economic growth. This effect occurs as corruption weakens the effectiveness of FDI on growth; therefore, 
through various independent studies, it is concluded that decreasing levels of corruption may significantly 
increase the benefits from FDI and growth in developing countries (Delgado et al).  
The underlying nature of a country to explain current corruption goes hand in hand with the 
quality of governance and its effect on the debt to growth ratio of a country. Utilizing the existing 
literature by linking quality of governmental institutions and economic growth, an approach to explaining 
the previous effect has been undertaken in various studies. Since 1996, attention has been drawn to 
corruption when considering the factors stopping a country’s economy from growing. This happened 20 
years ago, during the World Bank’s annual meeting, a time when corruption consequences were already 
significant. Economists shared different papers explaining how debt can prevent a country from growing. 
Academicians also researched how control of corruption matters for growth. What is interesting about a 
particular study is how the ideas shared by economists and academicians were put together to explain the 
dependence of debt-growth ratio to corruption and democracy (Jalles). The model in the paper uses data 
from 72 developing countries on control of corruption and values of debt to GDP ratios, among others. It 
has mainly been researched within the literature how a corrupted government will use debt to finance 
public projects that won’t necessarily bring growth. Instead, corrupted institutions try to find financed 
projects that allow for more corruption. The conclusions gathered from the literature give way to 
countries with lower corruption being able to manage their debt better than countries with higher 
corruption indexes.  
It can be seen how the existing literature helps develop our research even if it gives a completely 
different approach to a fairly similar subject. Rather than measuring growth by a single factor, studies 
have looked at growth as part of a ratio with the country’s debt. Also, corruption has been measured in 
different ways (such as control) as opposed to how we’ve chosen to measure it (through strength and 
transparency of the government). Finally, all of the literature focuses on explaining various factors in a 
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country through corruption as opposed to the other way around. That is what makes our research unique; 
the data used for the chosen variables come from different measures and, most importantly, the 
explanatory variables are switched with the explained compared to past research conducted, giving a 
different approach to explaining differences in prosperity for developing and emerging countries.  
 
III. Data 
As it was stated in the introduction, the purpose of this paper is trying to explain corruption in 
developing and emerging countries by a set of economic parameters and measures of development; a 
measure of corruption will be the dependent variable, and it will be ultimately explained by three 
independent variables: the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the developing country, the human 
development index (HDI), and the social progress index (SPI). We believe that these three independent 
variables really encompass the economic environment in a country. The GDP per capita directly measures 
the ratio between the economic output of a country and its population. The HDI measures quality of life 
in the country for it is calculated from life expectancy, education levels, and the gross national income, all 
three modified and standardized to produce the index. With a higher life expectancy, education, and per 
capita income, citizens have a greater chance of playing a watchdog role in the government since their 
quality of life (measured directly by the HDI) is better. Finally, the social progress index measures three 
important aspects of a country: basic human needs, foundations of wellbeing, and opportunity. Within the 
three sectors, there are components such as personal safety, health and wellness, and personal rights 
respectively. Typically, the more of each of the components within the three measures, the greater quality 
of life resulting in a greater awareness of the government’s practices by the public. Therefore, HDI and 
SPI can be used to explain levels of corruption in a country since citizens have a greater chance of being 
speculative of a government’s practices. For our research, data on GDP per capita, HDI, and SPI was 
collected from the year 2014 since that is the most recent year for which data was available for all three 
variables in our data sources. 
Before coming up with the model described above, other independent variables were included in 
the multiple-regression analysis to try and determine which variables best explained the level of 
corruption in developing countries. Some of these other variables were the type of government in the 
country, included as a dummy variable, the level of unemployment in the country, the income tax rate 
collected in the country, and the Gini index which measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of 
family income in a country. Details of this model are included further in the paper; since none of these 
additional variables proved strong significance in explaining corruption, they were not included in the 
final model. Possible reasons for this reduction in the model’s statistical significance are presented along 
with the model’s details. 
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For determining which countries to use for our research, we referred to the 26th IUGG General 
Assembly that published a list of developing and emerging countries based upon United Nations sources 
(refer to Appendix A). The World Bank was used as a source to determine each country's GDP per capita. 
Additionally, this source categorizes countries’ GDPs based on groups defined by high, medium, or low 
income; thus, based on these groups and the list found from the General Assembly, 134 developing 
countries were chosen for this analysis. Furthermore, we used the Developing Programme of the United 
Nations’ annual HDI (Human Development Index) data for our analysis. Since the most updated data for 
HDI was 2014, this was used as the reference year for the rest of the gathered data. The Control of 
Corruption was gathered from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). Lastly, the 
SPI (Social Progress Index) was gathered from The Social Progress Imperative Organization webpage. 
The sources for the additional variables, not included in the final model, can be seen in the table below.  
As it was discussed above, the final model incorporates three independent variables: GDP per 
capita, SPI, and HDI. All three explain the control of corruption index. The descriptive statistics for these 
variables, and others used to construct different experimental models are shown below in Table 1 and 
Table 2. 
Table 1: Variable Descriptions and Sources  
Variable Variable Description  
Control of Corruption (worldcpi)  Control of Corruption from Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) from 2014. According to the 
WGI, this index “reflects perception of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both perry and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private 
interests”. The index ranges from -2.5(weak, very 
corrupt) to 2.5 (strong, transparent government). 
GDP per Capita (gdperc)  Gross Domestic Product per capita from the year 
2014, measured in US dollars, recorded by World 
Bank. 
HDI (Life Expectancy, Education Index, and 
Gross National Income) 
Human Development Index in 2014 (ratio from 0-1) 
from The Developing Programme of the United 
Nations’ annual HDI report. Measured by life 
expectancy at birth, education index, and GNI per 
capita.  
SPI (Basic Human Needs, Foundations of 
Wellbeing, and Opportunity) 
Social Progress Index in 2014 (in percentage, from 
0-100) was gathered from The Social Progress 
Imperative Organization webpage. Composed of 3 
dimensions: Basic Human Needs, Foundations of 
Wellbeing, and Opportunity. 
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Unemployment  Levels of unemployment from the year 2014 
gathered from Trading Economics given as a 
percentage for each country included in the study.  
Gini index (gini2010) The Gini index (ranging from 0, being income 
distributed with perfect equality, to 100, being 
income distributed with perfect inequality) 
measures the degree of inequality in the distribution 
of family income in a country. The data was 
gathered from the CIA World Factbook. GINI 
coefficient for developing countries dated between 
2010-present. The majority of the countries had 
data for 2014, however for those that did not, data 
from previous years (2010-2013) was used.  
Government Type  
(govparr, govpresr, govsemir) 
Three dummy variables were created for the four 
most common government types for these countries. 
If the country had a certain government type, the 
dummy variable for such type acquired a value of 1. 
One government type was left without a dummy 
variable for not all are included in the model due to 
multicollinearity.  
The four main government types for the list of 
countries are Presidential Republic (govpresr), 
Parliamentary Republic (govparr), Semi-
Presidential Republic (govsemir), and 
Constitutional Monarchy.  
The benchmark model is the one where the country 
has a Constitutional Monarchy (all the three dummy 
variables for the other types are zero).  
Personal Income Tax Rate (tax) This variable represents the percent of income taxed 
in each of the developing countries. Data was 














Table 2: Summary Statistics of Variables  
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
Control of 
Corruption 
134 -0.496 0.622 -1.61 1.48 
GDP per Capita 131 4,438.997 3,949.716 286 21,317.4 
HDI 131 0.625 0.128 0.35 0.84 
SPI 94 57.042 10.551 32.6 77.75 
Unemployment 134 11.592 9.922 0.5 54 
Income Tax 
Rate 
134 23.798 10.867 5.2 60 
Gini Index 91 40.709 9.496 23.7 63.2 
Government 
Type 1.  
134 0.440  0.498 0 1 
Government 
Type 2 
134 0.172 0.378 0 1 
Government 
Type 3 
134 0.112 0.316 0 1 
Government Type 1: Parliamentary Republic 
Government Type 2: Presidential Republic 







Table 3: Correlation Among Variables: 














SPI 1         




0.624 0.728 1       
Unempl
oyment 
-0.200 -0.215 -0.158 1      
Gov. 
Type: 1 
0.363 0.317 0.273 0.010 1     
Gov.  
Type: 2 
-0.274 -0.397 -0.258 -0.002 -0.500 1    
Gov. 
Type: 3 
0.100 0.093 -0.051 0.288 -0.167 -0.299 1   
Income 
Tax  
-0.074 -0.220 -0.134 -0.013 -0.083 0.168 -0.065 1  
Gini 
Index 
-0.042 -0.196 -0.054 0.105 -0.264 0.414 -0.241 0.370 1 
Government Type 1: Parliamentary Republic 
Government Type 2: Presidential Republic 





Something important to note from Table 2 above is that the number of observations changes for 
some of the variables, because certain data was not available for all countries (as for the case of the Gini 
coefficient described in Table 1). The minimum and maximum values for each of the variables is also 
represented in this table. Furthermore, the variables chosen did not offer a given value to some of the 
countries listed for the paper.  
In regards to the Gauss Markov Assumptions, our data meets Assumption 1, linear in slope and 
intercept parameters, and this can be seen in the table included in the results’ section.  In addition, we 
have ensured a random sample of countries (Assumption 2) by including the developing and emerging 
countries that the 26th IUGG General Assembly published in a list (as described previously in this 
research) instead of manually deciding which countries to use in our sample, because that could cause 
sample bias. Passing to Assumption 3, it can be seen from the data of the independent variables that their 
variance is bigger than zero. For instance, if looking at GDP per capita, the actual data for any given 
country will be different than the GDP of any other country; thus the GDP variable will have positive 
variance. Additionally, from the methodology used to calculate each of the independent variables, there is 
no perfect correlation between any of them. This can also be seen in Table 3, where only the Social 
Progress Index and the Human Development Index have a relatively high correlation (𝑅2=0.878), 
however it is not a perfect correlation (all other correlations yielded even lower 𝑅2values). Doing a 
simple regression model between any of the independent variables never results in R2 being equal to one 
(refer to Table 3). Therefore, there is no perfect correlation among any of the independent variables. For 
our simple regression, Assumption 4 (E(u|x)=0) is not met, because there are factors contained in the error 
term which are correlated with GDP per capita, such as HDI. Because of the violation of Assumption 4, 
additional independent variables were incorporated into the regression when constructing the multiple 
regression analysis, thus meeting Assumption 4. Finally, for Assumption 5 (Var(u|x) = 𝜎2), the variance 
of the unobserved factors/error term for our multiple regression will remain constant given the chosen 
independent variables, and leaving no variables in the error term that could vary depending on the 
explicitly included independent variables. 
 
III. Results 
STATA Results:  
As it was mentioned above, the simple regression model will try and explain corruption from 
GDP per capita for each of the countries. Because of this, a scatter plot of log GDP per capita in x and 
Control of Corruption in y is provided below. After conducting different analyses, the logarithm of the 
GDP per capita explained the level of corruption the best (gave a higher R-squared value and p-value 




Simple Regression Scatter Plot: Control of Corruption vs. Log(GDP per capita)  
 
As evident, the scatter plot does shows a slight positive correlation between the variables (R2 = 
0.152), and the simple regression model yielded statistical significance at a 1% level for the GDP per 
capita variable. Since a more positive score for corruption (approaching 2.5), indicates a more transparent 
and stronger government, the scatter plot supports the initial hypothesis, that an increasing level of GDP 
per capita often explains a lower level of corruption (higher score) in developing and emerging countries.  
The STATA output for this model 1, the simple regression, can be found in the Appendix B. However, 
the multiple regression model will try to further explain the additional independent variables’ impact on 
the dependent variable.  
After running our simple and multiple regression models, we generated the following outputs to 
supplement our analysis. Table 4 below provides details of the different models developed and their 
respective significances. As seen in the table, even though model 2 (STATA output shown in the 
Appendix B) gave the highest R-squared value (R2 = 0.414), only one independent variable contained a 
significance level of 1%, SPI.  On the other hand, model 3 (STATA output in Appendix B) represented 
the highest significance in the independent variables with HDI and SPI containing high significance 
(more than 1%), and log(GDP per capita) proven jointly significance with HDI and SPI as showed in the 
robustness test below. Additionally, the number of observations remained greater in model 3 (n= 91) 
when compared to the model 2 (n= 55), which also proves a stronger model. Therefore, model 3 was 





Table 4: OLS Regression Estimates: Summary Table with all models and significance  
Dependent Variable: Control of Corruption 
Independent Variables Model 1:  
Simple Regression:  
Corrup = ß0 +  
ß1log(GDP per capita) 
+ u 
Model 2:  
Corrup= ß0 +  
ß1log(GDP per capita) 
+ ß2HDI + ß3SPI  + 
ß4Unempl + 
ß5IncomeRate + 
ß6GovType + u   
Model 3 (final): 
 Corrup = ß0 +  
ß1log(GDP per capita) 
+ ß2HDI + ß3SPI + u 























Gini Coefficient  0.0118* 
(t-stat) 
 






























No. of obs. 131 55 91 
R-square 0.152 0.414 0.372 
Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1% 
 
Next, robustness tests were conducted. As it can be seen in Table 4, taking the log of GDP per 
capita yielded high statistical significance for such variable in model 1. Passing then to model 3, which is 
the final model, it can be seen that SPI and HDI are still statistically significant at different confidence 
levels, but the same is not true for GDP per capita. Two robustness tests are conducted below on model 3 
to check whether log(GDP per capita) and HDI or log(GDP per capita) and SPI, respectively, are jointly 
significant.  
The first null hypothesis is that (ß1, ß2) both are equal to zero. This results in the following 
restricted model: 
Restricted Model #1: Corrup = ß0 + ß1SPI + u 
F-Statistic Formula:  
 
Using the STATA output results from the restricted model 1, the results from model 3, and the 
formula for the F-Stat, the F-statistic is calculated to test the null hypothesis. Using q=2 restricted 
variables, n=91 observations in the unrestricted model, and k=3, the value for such F-statistic is equal to 
7.753. Since the F-statistic is greater than the critical value obtained (about 3.10 at a 5% confidence) with 
q=2 and degrees of freedom in the denominator = 90 (closest to 87), the null hypothesis is rejected and it 
can be concluded that the log(GDP per capita) and HDI are jointly significant at a 5% confidence level.   
The second null hypothesis is that (ß1, ß3) both are equal to zero. This results in the following 
restricted model: 
Restricted Model #2:  Corrup = ß0 + ß1HDI+ u 
Using the STATA output (seen in the Appendix) for this restricted model 2, the results from 
model 3, the F-statistic is calculated. With q=2 restricted variables, n=91 observations in the unrestricted 
model, and k=3, the value for such F-statistic is equal to 70.22. Since the F-Statistic is again greater than 
the critical value obtained previously (about 3.10 at a 5% confidence), the null hypothesis is rejected and 
it can be concluded that log(GDP per capita) and SPI are also jointly significant at a 5% confidence level.   
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IV. Conclusion  
 As it has been stated in this paper, past research has been done to analyze if the level of 
corruption in a country could affect its economic situation, and conclusions have been made stating that 
this is the case: as a country’s government is more corrupt, it has a lower income. Our research aimed to 
investigate if this relationship could be inverted, where if a country has more income, its level of 
corruption decreases.  
We can conclude from our research that log(GDP per capita) is positively correlated with the 
Control of Corruption index in the simple regression model. This is because as GDP per capita increases, 
corruption is more controlled (approaching a score of 2.5 which is typically seen in a strong, transparent 
government). An attempt to explain corruption through including more variables such as unemployment, 
income tax rate, and government type was conducted. However, all variables, except SPI, lost 
significance which led to the elimination of model 2 as the final model. Instead, there is a better 
explanation for corruption in model 3. Although log(GDP per capita) loses statistical significance in our 
chosen model 3, there is sufficient evidence to conclude a joint significance between HDI with GDP per 
capita and SPI with GDP per capita. That means that together HDI and GDP per capita have a greater 
effect on explaining corruption than they do by themselves. The same applies to SPI with GDP per capita. 
This is more than likely due to the fact that these indices contain similar (but not perfectly correlated) 
explanatory factors that are used to calculate them.   
An important caveat to note is that even though we didn’t choose model 2 as our final model, the 
effects of unemployment, income tax rate, and government type should not be ruled out when explaining 
corruption in developing and emerging countries. Different methodologies to conduct the measurement of 
each of these excluded variables could represent a greater impact on corruption than what was discovered 
in model 2. Therefore, suggestions for further research would include researching different ways in which 
the excluded variables of model 2 have been analyzed so that they can be incorporated into model 3 since 
they further explain corruption. In addition, although we determined that as GDP per capita increases, 
corruption is more controlled, the exact rationale behind this correlation was not determined. We advise 
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A. List of Developing and Emerging Countries:  
Afghanistan Comoros Islamic Republic of Iran Morocco Sri Lanka 
Albania Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
Iraq Mozambique St. Lucia 
Algeria Republic of Congo Jamaica Myanmar St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Angola Costa Rica Jordan Namibia Sudan 
Argentina Côte d'Ivoire Kazakhstan Nepal Suriname 
Armenia Djibouti Kenya Nicaragua Swaziland 
Azerbaijan Dominica Kiribati Niger Tajikistan 
Bangladesh Dominican Republic Kyrgyzstan Nigeria Tanzania 
Belarus Ecuador Laos Pakistan Thailand 
Belize Egypt Lebanon Palau Timor-Leste 
Benin El Salvador Lesotho Panama Togo 
Bhutan Eritrea Liberia Papua New Guinea Tonga 
Bolivia Ethiopia Libya Paraguay Trinidad and Tobago 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Fiji FYR Macedonia Peru Tunisia 
Botswana Gabon Madagascar Philippines Turkey 
Brazil The Gambia Malawi Romania Turkmenistan 
Bulgaria Georgia Malaysia Russia Tuvalu 
Burkina Faso Ghana Maldives Rwanda Uganda 
Burundi Grenada Mali Samoa Ukraine 
Cabo Verde Guatemala Marshall Islands São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
Uzbekistan 
Cambodia Guinea Mauritania Senegal Vanuatu 
Cameroon Guinea-Bissau Mauritius Serbia Venezuela 
Central African R Guyana Mexico Seychelles Vietnam 
Chad Haiti Micronesia Sierra Leone Yemen 
Chile Honduras Moldova Solomon Islands Zambia 
China India Mongolia South Africa Zimbabwe 




B. STATA Outputs:  
Simple Regression STATA Results. Dependent Variable: Control of Corruption  
 
 





Final Multiple Regression Model STATA Results. Dependent Variable: Control of Corruption 
 
Restricted Model #1: Corrup = ß0 + ß1SPI + u 
 
Restricted Model #2:  Corrup = ß0 + ß1HDI+ u 
 
